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The Oregon Treaty of 1846 established the forty-ninth parallel asthe boundary between British and American interests in westernNorth America. Described in treaty text and drawn on a map in
a distant capital, this international border severed Aboriginal worlds that
at the time were largely oblivious to the remote geopolitical maneuver-
ings of two imperial powers. Eventually the border would constrain the
movement of people whose lives spanned it, in some cases restricting or
eliminating access to important resource procurement and village sites,
and also to markets on its other side.1 More immediately, after 1846
those to the north of the border negotiated with the British Crown the
terms of their coexistence with incoming settlers, those to its south with
the United States. As a result, while some of the Coast Salish and
Kwakwakawakw peoples in what would become British Columbia con-
cluded treaties between 1850 and 1854 with the Crown’s representative,
James Douglas, the tribes in the United States settled with the governor
of the Washington territory, Isaac I. Stevens, in 1854 and 1855.
In the Douglas and the Stevens treaties, as the agreements came to be
known, Britain and the United States sought to extinguish Aboriginal
rights and title and to replace them with a defined set of treaty rights.
These treaty rights included monetary payment and guarantees of
reserved land, hunting rights, and fishing rights.2 The fisheries provi-
sions in the written text of the treaties were short. The Douglas treaties
reserved to Aboriginal peoples the right to “their fisheries as formerly”;3
the Stevens treaties provided that “the right of taking fish at usual and
accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians in
common with all citizens of the Territory.”4
This essay focuses on the relationship between U.S. and Canadian
judicial interpretations of these treaty rights to fish. In the first two sec-
tions the essay describes the rulings in United States v. Washington
(known as “the Boldt decision”)5 and Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association (Passenger Fishing
Vessel).6 It then explores the impact of these two cases from the United
States on the general development of Aboriginal and treaty rights in
Canada. Although not widely cited in Canadian courts, the U.S. deci-
sions have had a profound influence on Canadian Aboriginal law.7 In
particular, the priority that Canadian courts accord to conservation and
then to the Aboriginal food fisheries, before commercial and sport fish-
eries, is closely correlated with the fishing rights framework established
in the Boldt decision. In addition, the idea that treaty rights to fish entail
a right to a moderate livelihood, now well established in Canada, comes
directly from the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Stevens
treaties in Passenger Fishing Vessel.
The third part of the essay considers the historical evidence pertain-
ing to fishing rights in the Douglas treaties and suggests various inter-
pretations. Finally, it turns to the Boldt decision and away from
Passenger Fishing Vessel to offer the outlines of a reasonable judicial
determination of treaty rights to fish in British Columbia. The question
remains whether these U.S. decisions provide useful guidance for the
interpretation of the fishing rights provision in the Douglas treaties. The
difference in legal jurisdictions certainly limits their applicability, but
Canadian courts are more inclined to consider decisions from other juris-
dictions than are their U.S. counterparts. In the area of Aboriginal law
Canadian courts frequently refer to U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice
John Marshall’s nineteenth-century trilogy and many later Indian and
treaty rights cases as well.8
Beyond case law, the fact that many fish — including salmon, halibut,
and herring — traverse the international boundary suggests that courts
should pay some attention to judicial pronouncements from its other
side. Moreover, except for the two treaties with the Kwakwakawakw
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at the north end of Vancouver Island, the fisheries covered by the Doug-
las treaties are in Coast Salish territory, as are the Stevens treaties
around Puget Sound. Douglas and Stevens negotiated with peoples who
shared a cultural heritage and an economic base in the fisheries that
long preceded the Canada-U.S. border in western North America.9 They
also share a broadly similar history of lost access to their fisheries, at
least until the Boldt decision.10 For these reasons, and for the simple
fact that the fishing rights under the Stevens treaties have received more
legal and scholarly attention than the fishing rights under the Douglas
treaties, the U.S. decisions are a relevant and important resource in
determining the division and management of the fisheries in British
Columbia.
UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON (the boldt decision)
In 1970 the U.S. government and several tribal governments sued the
State of Washington for its repeated harassment of Indian fishers and its
disregard for the fishing rights in the Stevens treaties. The treaties pro-
vided that “the right of taking fish at usual and accustomed grounds and
stations is further secured to said Indians in common with all citizens of
the Territory.”11 From the advent of an industrial commercial fishery
on the Pacific Coast in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the
state, which has jurisdiction over fisheries in state waters, maintained
that the treaties did little more than permit tribe members to participate
individually in the fisheries on the same terms as the rest of the public.
The federal government disagreed. It presented extensive historical and
anthropological evidence to the court to establish that although the tribes
had ceded land under the treaties, they had reserved to themselves exten-
sive off-reservation fishing rights, including the right to a substantial
share of the fish that returned to the tribes’ “usual and accustomed” fish-
ing places.12 Given this divergence of opinion, all the parties understood
U.S. v. Washington to be an important test case, meant to settle issues
unresolved after several earlier judicial interpretations of treaty fishing
rights.13
The principal rulings in the ensuing decision, released on February 12,
1974, involved the allocation and management of the fisheries. First, Judge
George Boldt held that the treaty right to fish “in common” amounted to
a right to catch up to 50 percent of the harvestable anadromous fish
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(salmon and steelhead) at “usual and accustomed” tribal fisheries: “‘In
common with’ means sharing equally the opportunity to take fish at
‘usual and accustomed grounds and stations’; therefore, non-treaty fish-
ermen shall have the opportunity to take up to 50% of the harvestable
number of fish that may be taken by all fishermen at usual and accus-
tomed grounds and stations and treaty right fishermen shall have the
opportunity to take up to the same percentage of harvestable fish.”14
By “harvestable” Judge Boldt meant commercially harvestable; the fish-
eries were to be divided equally after accounting for conservation
requirements and the needs of the Indian ceremonial and subsistence
fishery. Ceremonial and subsistence fishing, he wrote, had “a special
treaty significance distinct from and superior to the taking of fish for
commercial purposes.”15
Judge Boldt also held that the tribes had the right to manage their off-
reservation fisheries, and he set out the terms under which that respon-
sibility might be assumed. Two tribes — the Quinault and the Yakima —
could assume jurisdiction immediately because of their existing fisheries
management experience, the others when they had established the capac-
ity to do so. The state had the right to regulate the off-reservation treaty
right to fish but only to the extent necessary to ensure the preservation
of the species: “The fishing right was reserved by the Indians and cannot
be qualified by the state. The state has police power to regulate off reser-
vation fishing only to the extent reasonable and necessary for conserva-
tion of the resource. For this purpose, conservation is defined to mean
perpetuation of the fisheries species. Additionally the state must not dis-
criminate against the Indians, and must meet appropriate due process
standards.”16 In other words the treaty right to fish had priority over the
state’s right to manage the fishery, with the one exception that the state
might limit the treaty right in order to preserve and sustain the fisheries.
However, the state had to achieve its conservation objectives legitimately
and fairly; it could not discriminate against the Indians by imposing con-
servation burdens so that others might fish.
The Boldt decision outraged many non-Aboriginal fishers, who turned
to protest and civil disobedience but also to the state courts.17 In 1977
the Washington Supreme Court held that Judge Boldt’s interpretation
of the treaties, by allocating the right to catch up to half of the com-
mercial fisheries to a small proportion of the population (treaty Indians),
violated the equal rights protection in the U.S. Constitution.18 In this
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context of legal and political turmoil, Judge Boldt assumed continuing
oversight of the implementation of his ruling.
Then in 1979, on appeal from the cases in the state courts, the U.S.
Supreme Court largely confirmed the Boldt decision. However, in Pas-
senger Fishing Vessel the Supreme Court altered the original decision in
two ways: it held that the 50 percent allocation was to include the tribal
ceremonial and subsistence fishery (rather than calculated after account-
ing for that fishery) and 50 percent was the maximum allocation (not
the minimum). If the ability of tribal members to secure a “moderate liv-
ing” from the fishery required fewer fish, then the treaty right could be
honored with an allocation of less than 50 percent. The Supreme Court
offered no legal or historical basis for limiting the right to a level that
supported a “moderate livelihood” — a ruling that has not been widely
adopted in U.S. Indian treaty interpretation19 but, according to the
Court, was central to the decision:
The central principle here must be that Indian treaty rights to a natural
resource that once was thoroughly and exclusively exploited by the Indians
secures so much as, but no more than, is necessary to provide the Indians
with a livelihood — that is to say, a moderate living. Accordingly, while the
maximum possible allocation to the Indians is fixed at 50%, the minimum is
not; the latter will . . . be modified in response to changing circumstances. If,
for example, a tribe should dwindle to just a few members, or if it should find
other sources of support that lead it to abandon its fisheries, a 45% or 50%
allocation of an entire run that passes through its customary fishing grounds
would be manifestly inappropriate because the livelihood of the tribe under
these circumstances could not reasonably require an allotment of a large num-
ber of fish.20
Although measures to implement the treaty rights were contested after
the Supreme Court decision, the basic parameters had been established.
Under the Stevens treaties Indian tribes had a right to catch up to 50 per-
cent of the harvestable fish at usual and accustomed places in order to
secure for their members a “moderate living”; if that could be achieved
with fewer fish, then the entitlement would be reduced. Once they had
demonstrated the capacity to manage the fisheries, Indian tribes were to
assume jurisdiction over their fisheries. The Washington Fisheries and
Game departments had the capacity to limit the treaty right, but only
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for the purpose of ensuring the continuing viability of the resource. Con-
servation measures could not discriminate against Indians.
from the boldt decision to JACK, SPARROW,
GLADSTONE, and MARSHALL
Within three weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Pas-
senger Fishing Vessel, the Supreme Court of Canada released its deci-
sion in Regina v. Jack.21 It was the first foray of that Court into
Aboriginal fishing rights in British Columbia, although the members of
the Cowichan Tribes who were charged with Fisheries Act offenses did
not raise an Aboriginal or treaty rights defense. The Cowichan, a Coast
Salish community on eastern Vancouver Island, were not party to the
Douglas treaties, and the entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights
in the Canadian constitution was still three years away.22 The Cowichan
therefore relied on the colonial policy not to interfere with Aboriginal
fisheries and on the federal government’s commitment in the terms of
union with British Columbia, when it assumed responsibility for Indians
and fisheries in British Columbia in 1871, that it would continue “a pol-
icy as liberal as that hitherto pursued by the British Columbia govern-
ment” in its management of Indian affairs.23
The Jack decision turned on the details of Canadian federalism,
whereas the Boldt decision involved an interpretation of treaty rights in
Washington State. It is hardly surprising therefore that the Supreme
Court of Canada did not refer to the U.S. case. However, two basic prin-
ciples outlined in the Boldt decision — that the government with juris-
diction over the fisheries might limit the exercise of the treaty right to fish
only for conservation purposes, and that the Indian food and ceremonial
fishery had priority over other fisheries — reappeared in the Canadian
decision. The majority dismissed the Cowichan defense, rejecting the
argument that the terms of union inhibited or limited Canada’s juris-
diction over Aboriginal fisheries. Justice Brian Dickson concurred in the
result, although for very different reasons.
Justice Dickson found that “the colony [of British Columbia] gave
priority to the Indian fishery as an appropriate pursuit for the coastal
Indians, primarily for food purposes and, to a lesser extent, for barter
purposes with white residents.”24 Therefore, because the federal gov-
ernment assumed responsibility for Indians and fisheries in British
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Columbia and undertook to treat the former as liberally as the colonial
government had done, it had to recognize the priority of the Indian fish-
eries. However, this priority was subject to the overriding goal of con-
servation, and Justice Dickson adopted the following priority scheme:
“(i) conservation; (ii) Indian fishing; (iii) non-Indian commercial fishing,
or (iv) non-Indian sports fishing.” The priority of the Indian fishery, he
continued, “is at its strongest when we speak of Indian fishing for food
purposes, but somewhat weaker when we come to local commercial pur-
poses. If there are to be limitations upon the taking of salmon here, then
those limitations must not bear more heavily upon the Indian fishery
than the other forms of the fishery.”25 The proposition that an Indian
food fishery had priority and that the federal Department of Fisheries
might have to justify its regulation of the Indian fisheries on the basis of
conservation were important developments — ones that bore a distinct
resemblance to the ruling in the Boldt decision.
Eleven years later the Supreme Court of Canada, then led by Chief
Justice Dickson, would develop this priority scheme in Regina v. Spar-
row, the case that would become the cornerstone in the interpretation of
Aboriginal rights in Canada.26 In Sparrow the Court held that the
Musqueam, a Coast Salish community at the mouth of the Fraser River
and not party to the Douglas treaties, had an “aboriginal right to fish for
food and social and ceremonial purposes.”27 Chief Justice Dickson and
Justice Gérard La Forest then applied the priority scheme first outlined
in Jack to infuse the right with content. In practice, the right provided
that “if, in a given year, conservation needs required a reduction in the
number of fish to be caught such that the number equalled the number
required for food by the Indians, then all the fish available after conser-
vation would go to the Indians according to the constitutional nature of
their fishing right. If, more realistically, there were still fish after the
Indian food requirements were met, then the brunt of conservation meas-
ures would be borne by the practices of sport and commercial fishing.”28
Thus, after conservation the Indian food fishery had priority. But con-
servation was, in the Court’s words, a “compelling and substantial”
objective that would justify the federal government’s infringement of an
Aboriginal right to fish.29 To this extent, the judgment mirrored the
Boldt decision without citing it.
However, Canada’s Supreme Court went further, suggesting that the
federal government might have other objectives, such as the prevention
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of harm, that might justify infringing an Aboriginal right. The standard
was high; the “public interest,” for example, was too vague and uncer-
tain an objective to justify limiting a constitutional right.30 This con-
straint on the Crown’s capacity to infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights
marks an important difference between Canadian and U.S. law. While
federal power to abrogate Indian treaty rights in the United States is
nearly unconstrained,31 if seldom exercised, in Canada the federal gov-
ernment’s capacity to limit Aboriginal and treaty rights has been reduced
since those rights were entrenched in the constitution in 1982. As a
result, in Sparrow the Supreme Court held that the federal government
must justify its infringement of an Aboriginal right by establishing a com-
pelling and substantial objective (such as conservation), and that its
actions in pursuing that objective reflect the honor of the Crown in its
relationship with Aboriginal peoples.32
In Sparrow the Supreme Court did not address the priority of an Abo-
riginal right to a commercial fishery. Justice Dickson had hinted in Jack
that it would be less secure, and the Court confirmed this approach six
years later in the case of Regina v. Gladstone.33 In that case Chief  Justice
Antonio Lamer, writing for the majority, concluded that the Heiltsuk
had an Aboriginal right to a commercial herring-spawn-on-kelp fishery.
This right, he continued, conferred priority but not exclusivity.34 As 
a result, the federal government might justifiably infringe the right to 
a commercial fishery not only for conservation purposes, but also to
 pursue policies of “economic and regional fairness” or to recognize 
“the historical reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by non-
 aboriginal groups.”35
These objectives were too broad for some members of the Court. Jus-
tice Beverley McLachlin replied in Regina v. Vander Peet, a decision the
Supreme Court released with Gladstone, that Chief Justice Lamer’s test,
which required a balancing of social policy objectives against constitu-
tional rights, was “indeterminate and ultimately more political than
legal.”36 In rejecting Chief Justice Lamer’s approach, Justice McLachlin
defined the right to a commercial fishery much less expansively, sug-
gesting that “the Aboriginal right to trade in herring spawn on kelp from
the Bella Bella region is limited to such trade as secures the modern
equivalent of sustenance: the basics of food, clothing and housing, sup-
plemented by a few amenities.”37 Similarly, in her dissenting opinion in
Vander Peet, Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé constructed the commercial
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fishing right as “an Aboriginal right to sell, trade and barter fish for liveli-
hood, support and sustenance purposes.”38 These dissenting opinions
defined the right more narrowly and thus avoided Chief Justice Lamer’s
expansive understanding of what might justify infringing an Aboriginal
right. However, the basis for this narrower interpretation is unclear.
Chief Justice Lamer responded that “the evidence in this case [Gladstone]
does not justify limiting the right to harvest herring spawn on kelp on a
commercial basis to, for example, the sale of herring spawn on kelp for
the purposes of obtaining a ‘moderate livelihood.’”39
The definitions in the dissenting opinions of Justices McLachlin and
L’Heureux-Dubé of Aboriginal rights to commercial fisheries as securing
the “modern equivalent of sustenance” or “livelihood, support and sus-
tenance” were new developments in the Supreme Court of Canada. They
derive from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Passenger Fishing Ves-
sel, although through reference to the dissenting opinion of Justice Doug-
las Lambert in the British Columbia Court of Appeal rather than to the
U.S. cases themselves. In Vander Peet Justice Lambert described the Abo-
riginal right to the salmon fishery fish as securing the right to “a mod-
erate livelihood” from that fishery, and he acknowledged Passenger
Fishing Vessel as his source.40
In the context of Aboriginal rights, therefore, the right to fish for food
is broadly established following Sparrow. However, each First Nation
must establish the right to a commercial fishery independently. Where
established (and to this point only the Heiltsuk in Gladstone have suc-
cessfully established such a right, and only for their herring spawn-on-
kelp fishery), the commercial right is expansive, although subject to
broad federal powers to infringe that right. The dissenting approach —
to define the rights in terms of a moderate livelihood — has not been
adopted.
In the context of treaty rights (as distinct from Aboriginal rights) to
fish, however, the moderate livelihood standard is well established in
Canada. Again, although the Canadian rulings have not included direct
citations, it is plain that this understanding originates in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Stevens treaties in Passenger Fish-
ing Vessel. In Regina v. Marshall, for example, the Mikmaq of Nova
Scotia contested a prosecution on the grounds that they had a treaty
right to fish derived from an eighteenth-century agreement with the
British. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed in 1999 but limited the
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commercial right to fish to that which secured the “equivalent to a mod-
erate livelihood”; the right did “not extend to the open-ended accumu-
lation of wealth.”41 Justice Ian Binnie, who wrote for the majority,
tracked the lineage of the “moderate livelihood” definition of the right
from Justice Lambert in the B.C. Court of Appeal to Justices McLachlin
and L’Heureux Dubé in Gladstone and Vander Peet.42 He did not cite
the American antecedents, but their incorporation through Justice Lam-
bert, who dealt with them at length, seems clear.43
In sum, the principles articulated in the interpretation of the Stevens
treaties are a significant presence in the interpretation of Aboriginal and
treaty rights to fish in Canada, even if the U.S. decisions are seldom cited.
Given the importance of fishing rights to the articulation of Aboriginal
and treaty rights in general, the impact of these principles has been per-
vasive. With this legal framework established, the question remains how
the courts will interpret the fisheries clause in the Douglas treaties. That
will turn, at least in part, on the historical evidence.
“fisheries as formerly”
The agreements known as the Douglas treaties are the fourteen land pur-
chases from Aboriginal peoples on Vancouver Island made between
1850 and 1854 by James Douglas, the Hudson’s Bay Company’s (HBC)
chief trader and eventual governor of the colonies of Vancouver Island
and mainland British Columbia. They followed the British grant in 1849
of Vancouver Island to the HBC as a proprietary colony for the pur-
poses of settlement. The purchases were limited to the land around the
fort at Victoria, the Saanich Peninsula, the future townsite of Nanaimo
midway up the island, and land around Fort Rupert near the island’s
north eastern end. (See map 4.1.) With the exception in 1899 of Treaty
8 covering the northeast corner of British Columbia, the Douglas treaties
marked the beginning and the end of a treaty process and of the formal
recognition of Aboriginal title in the province until the 1990s.
Much has been written about why Douglas undertook these pur-
chases on Vancouver Island and why he did not continue them. It seems
that recognition of a legal requirement to extinguish Aboriginal title 
was an important part of his motivation for beginning the process, but
ebbing enthusiasm for treaties in the Colonial Office in London reduced
the incentive to continue the process when other interests intervened.  
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map 4.1 Boundaries of the Douglas Treaties, 1850– 54. The treaty process did
not continue beyond 1854, leaving the issue of Native title unresolved on the
rest of Vancouver Island and throughout most of the mainland colony of British
Columbia. source : The treaty boundaries were adapted from information
available in the Government of Canada’s Directory of Federal Real Property
(http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dfrp-rbif/treaty-traite.asp?Language=EN).
Historical geographer Cole Harris has emphasized Douglas’s pragma-
tism, born of a lifetime in the fur trade, suggesting that he was less con-
cerned about theories of Indian land policy and even of the law of
Aboriginal title than about finding workable solutions for Native and
European coexistence.44 Legal historians Hamar Foster and Alan Grove
speculate that the decision of an Oregon court to deny the existence of
Aboriginal title, discredited in Oregon and Washington but picked up
later in Alaska, may also have influenced Douglas and his successor in
the formation of colonial land policy, Commissioner of Lands Joseph
Trutch, who was openly hostile to the idea of Aboriginal title.45
The legal standing of Aboriginal title may have been fragile enough 
in the mid-nineteenth century that colonial authorities were prepared 
to ignore it, but there was less doubt about the existence of specific
 Aboriginal rights, particularly rights to hunt and fish. Moreover, pro-
tecting these rights, on which Aboriginal economies depended, fit
 Douglas’s pragmatism. Aboriginal peoples’ hunting could coexist with
non- Aboriginal ownership, if not use and occupation, of the land, and
the fishery could be secured without much impact on the land available
for incoming settlers. In anticipation of the treaties, Douglas wrote to
the HBC that he “would strongly recommend, equally as a matter of
justice, and from regard to the future peace of the colony, that the Indi-
ans Fishere’s [sic], Village Sitis [sic] and Fields, should be reserved for
their benifit [sic] and fully secured to them by law.”46 HBC secretary
Archibald Barclay, in setting out the company’s obligations and policy
toward Aboriginal peoples on Vancouver Island, instructed Douglas that
the “right of fishing and hunting will be continued to them.”47
On the basis of these instructions, Douglas entered negotiations with
the tribes on southern Vancouver Island. After minimal discussions (of
which no minutes were kept), Douglas asked the chiefs to place X’s on
blank sheets of paper. Following the conclusion of the first nine agree-
ments at Fort Victoria between April 29 and May 1, 1850, Douglas
wrote to the HBC to explain his understanding of what had transpired:
“I informed the natives that they would not be disturbed in the posses-
sion of their Village sites and enclosed fields, which are of small extent,
and that they were at liberty to hunt over unoccupied lands, and to carry
on their fisheries with the same freedom as when they were the sole occu-
pants of the country.”48 He forwarded the “signatures” of the chiefs
and asked that the HBC supply the proper conveyancing instrument to
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which the signatures could be attached. Several months later Barclay
replied, approving the agreements and sending a template, based on 
New Zealand precedents, that would become the text of the Douglas
treaties.49 The first paragraph would provide a description of the lands
that were covered by the treaty; the second described the terms as fol-
lows:
The condition of or understanding of this sale is this, that our [Indian] village
sites and enclosed fields are to be kept for our own use, for the use of our
children, and for those who may follow after us; and the land shall be prop-
erly surveyed, hereafter. It is understood, however, that the land itself
becomes the entire property of the white people for ever; it is also understood
that we are at liberty to hunt over the unoccupied lands, and to carry on our
fisheries as formerly.50
Although the structure and content of Barclay’s template emulated
the New Zealand deeds, the final clause setting out the hunting and fish-
ing rights was new. The guarantee that the tribes were “at liberty . . .  to
carry on our fisheries as formerly” appears to be an abbreviated version
of the agreement Douglas described several months earlier when he
wrote that the Native peoples “were at liberty . . . to carry on their fish-
eries with the same freedom as when they were the sole occupants of the
country.”
Given this sequence of events, the treaties are best understood as oral
agreements between Douglas and the chiefs. The written texts, based on
imperial precedent, drafted by someone not present at the negotiations
and supplied months afterwards, should be considered as evidence of
the terms of those agreements, not as the agreements themselves.51 As
evidence, the written texts probably provide reasonable indication of
what the HBC thought it needed to do and of how Douglas understood
the treaties. The anthropologist Wilson Duff considered the texts to be
“the white man’s conception (or at least his rationalization) of the situ-
ation as it was and of the transaction that took place.”52 They provide
little or highly qualified evidence at best of how the Aboriginal partici-
pants understood the agreements and should not be considered the full
texts of what were oral agreements. However, given the thin documen-
tary and oral history record surrounding the treaties, the written texts
assume particular importance.
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Even the terms of the written texts are not self-evident.53 It is clear,
however, that “fisheries” were important parts of the agreements. A
“fishery” (or its plural, “fisheries”) refers not only to the act of fishing
but also to the places where it occurs. In reserving “fisheries,” therefore,
the Douglas treaties reserved the right to fish in the places where Abo-
riginal people fished. It was the same approach that Governor Stevens
and the tribes in the Washington Territory would adopt in reserving the
“right of taking fish at usual and accustomed grounds and stations.”54
In neither case, however, were the boundaries of the right carefully
drawn. An abundance of fish was assumed in the 1850s, and there was
little non-Aboriginal interest in the fisheries. Even so, the fisheries were
not an afterthought. The HBC had deployed some of its workers to the
fisheries of the Fraser River in the 1840s but had realized that it was
more efficient and effective to purchase fish from Aboriginal fishers.
Those fish, which the HBC had been barrelling and salting on the Fraser
since the late 1820s, had become one of its principal exports from the
Pacific Coast of North America.55 Thus the treaties were concluded in
a context of well-established and ongoing commercial fishing involving
the HBC and Aboriginal peoples. Douglas believed that this would con-
tinue and hoped it would grow.
There is no evidence that either Douglas or the Aboriginal parties
understood their agreements as limited to food fishing. Several years after
concluding the last of the treaties, Douglas informed the Vancouver
Island House of Assembly that Aboriginal peoples “were to be protected
in their original right of fishing on the coast and in the bays of the
Colony.”56 In describing the fishing right as “original,” Douglas meant
that it preceded the British assertion of sovereignty and therefore derived
from sources other than the British Crown, not that it was limited to a
food fishery. In fact, the category of “Indian food fishing” was not yet a
way of thinking about Aboriginal fishing in British Columbia. Estab-
lished in Canadian fisheries regulations in the late nineteenth century, it
would become an important part of fisheries management and an effec-
tive way of diminishing Aboriginal peoples access to the fish, but it was
not part of the framework in which the treaties were negotiated.57
Rather, the treaties emerged in the context of a long-established com-
mercial relationship. The parties would have understood that the right
to “fisheries as formerly” included a continuing commercial fishery.
How expansive, then, was the understanding of the commercial aspect
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of the treaty right to fish? At one end of a spectrum of possible mean-
ings, the treaty right might have been intended to protect only commerce
between Aboriginal peoples. This is not likely. In fact, given the context
and the wording of the written text it is highly implausible that the Abo-
riginal peoples who participated in the negotiations understood they had
conceded anything in respect of their fisheries. Instead, the text suggests
that the Aboriginal signatories could continue their fisheries without any
non-Aboriginal restriction — that is, “as formerly.” At the other end of
the spectrum, therefore, the right could be interpreted literally as secur-
ing the fisheries exclusively to Aboriginal peoples. When the treaties were
concluded, Aboriginal peoples worked and managed the fisheries exclu-
sively. Moreover, the laws of many First Nations established certain fish-
eries as the exclusive property of one family or house-group.
However, Douglas certainly did not intend to preclude non-Aboriginal
fishing. He believed that the long-term prosperity of the colony depended
on attracting immigrants and that the fisheries would be one of its prin-
cipal draws. The HBC had sought control of the fisheries as part of the
Crown grant of Vancouver Island, but the Crown appears to have with-
drawn this provision, which was in an early draft, in the midst of wide-
spread public disapproval of the HBC in London.58 As a result, the HBC
prospectus for the colonization of Vancouver Island informed prospec-
tive settlers that “every freeholder shall enjoy the right of fishing all sorts
of fish in the seas, bays, and inlets of, or surrounding, the said Island.”59
With respect to tidal waters, then, the prospectus asserted the right of the
landowning public to fish as indeed the common law doctrine of the pub-
lic right to fish established it for the public at large.
Is it possible to reconcile previously exclusive Aboriginal fisheries with
the colonial public’s right to fish? In English law the Crown could not
limit the public right to fish in tidal waters (except with the sanction of
Parliament), but the common law doctrine did not affect exclusive fish-
eries that preexisted the British assertion of sovereignty and thus preex-
isted the common law in British Columbia.60 Such preexisting fisheries
would include exclusive Aboriginal fisheries. Under Aboriginal law some
fisheries were understood as exclusive property, but others were public,
at least in the sense that allies and trading partners were welcome to par-
ticipate.61 As a result, where Aboriginal peoples held what they under-
stood to be exclusive fishing rights, the Douglas treaties did not interfere
with those rights. In fact, the text confirms that existing fisheries were to
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be protected “as formerly.” Where they did not have exclusive fisheries
— areas that were understood as public fisheries — the treaties provided
the basis for non-Aboriginal participation.
Just as some areas of land under the treaties were to remain for the
exclusive use of Aboriginal peoples (village sites and fields), so some
Aboriginal fisheries in tidal and nontidal waters were also to remain
exclusively for Aboriginal peoples. But whereas most of the land was to
be opened for non-Aboriginal settlement and the reserved parcels were
small, the opposite was true in the fisheries. The treaties provided expan-
sive protection for the Aboriginal fisheries, with the prospect that non-
Aboriginal fishers could participate where they could do so without
interfering with these fisheries. Similarly, just as Aboriginal peoples had
the right to continue hunting in a manner that did not interfere with non-
Aboriginal occupation of lands (the right “to hunt over the unoccupied
lands”), so non-Aboriginal fishers had a right to fish so long as they did
not hinder the existing Aboriginal fisheries.62 In sum, the right to “fish-
eries as formerly” is best understood as protecting the Aboriginal fish-
eries, including the rights to catch fish and manage the fisheries in the
places where they conducted their fishing and the right to dispose of fish
for whatever purpose, but also as securing for the Crown the right to
grant settler access to fisheries that were not exclusive before the treaties.
This was a satisfactory resolution in the 1850s, when abundance was
assumed and there was little prospect that non-Aboriginal fishing would
interfere with the Aboriginal fisheries. However, beginning in the 1870s,
many Aboriginal fisheries would come under great strain when, with the
introduction of an industrial fishery, cannery boats worked by Aborigi-
nal and non-Aboriginal fishers occupied owned fishing grounds, and
 cannery fleets radically diminished the upriver fisheries on which many
Aboriginal peoples relied. At that point the federal Department of
Marine and Fisheries largely ignored the existing treaties and the
province, with federal acquiescence, refused to negotiate others. Indian
Reserve Commissioner Gilbert Malcolm Sproat, while working to allot
Indian reserves along the Fraser River as part of an Indian land policy in
the absence of treaties, wrote that “if the Crown had ever met the Indi-
ans of this Province in council with a view to obtain the surrender of
their lands for purposes of settlement, the Indians would in the first place
have made stipulations about their rights to get salmon to supply their
particular requirements.”63
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Instead of negotiating treaties, the two levels of government imposed
an Indian land policy that was premised on continuing Indian access to
their fisheries. The small and scattered Indian reserves allotted under
treaty or by the reserve commissions were intended primarily to provide
points of access to the fisheries that would support viable local econo-
mies. Without the fisheries the Indian reserve geography in British
Columbia provided little prospect for other commercial activity and
made little sense except as a means of clearing Aboriginal peoples from
the land.64 In this context the Aboriginal fisheries ought to have been,
in the words of James Douglas, “fully secured to them by law.” Those
who were parties to the Douglas treaties reasonably believed that they
had been.
judicial interpretation of “fisheries 
as formerly”
As of 2007, Canada’s courts had yet to provide a definitive judicial inter-
pretation of the right to “fisheries as formerly” in the Douglas treaties.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal’s 1989 decision in Saanichton
Marina Ltd. v. Tsawout Indian Band remained the principal judicial
statement of the treaty right to fish.65 In that case the Tsawout presented
evidence that Saanichton Bay, where they and their ancestors lived, “pro-
vided a wide variety of fish, shellfish, sea mammals and waterfowl
important in the economy and diet of the Saanich people.”66 They
claimed a continuing treaty right to fish and argued that a proposed
marina development in the bay infringed this right. The court agreed,
concluding that “the effect of the treaty is to afford to the Indians an
independent source of protection of their right to carry on their fisheries
as formerly,”67 and that in this case the “construction of the marina will
derogate from the right of the Indians to carry on their fisheries as for-
merly in the area of Saanichton Bay which is protected by the treaty.”68
Although the court was not explicit, the decision seemed to imply a right
to participate in determining what activities might coexist with their fish-
eries. In other words the treaty recognized the Tsawout right to access
and manage their fisheries.
After that decision the courts struggled to define the treaty right to
fish more precisely. It seemed clear that the treaties protect and give pri-
ority to a food fishery, a category that was firmly entrenched in Cana-
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dian law by then. In Regina v. Ellsworth, a case involving charges against
a member of the Tsartlip First Nation who was fishing coho and chi-
nook salmon in the Goldstream River for food purposes, Justice Murphy
of the British Columbia Supreme Court defined the right broadly to
include “fishing, conservation and the use of fish by the Indian people for
whatever purpose the fish were used by the signatories to the treaty. One
of these purposes was for food obviously.”69 In this view the treaty rec-
ognized the priority of the Native fishery, at least but not limited to a
food fishery, as well as a right to participate in the conservation or man-
agement of the fish stocks.
Justice Harvey Groberman, also of the British Columbia Supreme
Court, described a similar set of treaty rights, including priority to the
fishery and management rights, in Snuueymuxw First Nation v. British
Columbia. In that case the Snuueymuxw (Nanaimo) First Nation sought
an interlocutory injunction to remove log booms from the Nanaimo
River estuary on the basis that they damaged fish habitat and infringed
the treaty right to fish. Justice Groberman held: “The contours of the
right to ‘carry on fisheries as formerly’ have not been fully articulated by
the courts. The treaty would seem, at the very least, to entitle the First
Nation to priority over the fish stocks that exist. It also places responsi-
bilities on the Crown and vests the First Nation with powers to manage
the fishery in such a manner as not to jeopardize the constitutionally
protected rights of the Douglas Treaty First Nations.”70 The nature of
the priority, including the question of whether priority extends to a com-
mercial fishery, remained undeveloped. In Regina v. Hunt, Justice Brian
Saunderson of the British Columbia Provincial Court held that the treaty
right does not include either a commercial fishery or a deep-water fish-
ery because the Kwakiutl had not established, to his satisfaction, that
either activity was integral to the distinctive culture of the Kwakiutl.71
The Kwakiutl did not appeal Justice Saunderson’s decision, but they
subsequently brought a treaty fishing rights case on their terms. In Hunt
v. Canada they sued Canada and the province for a declaration that their
treaty right to fish in their territory includes “a priority right to harvest
the aquatic resources . . . and to the commercial sale of a reasonable
quantity of fish to meet their livelihood needs” and “a right to manage
and conserve the aquatic resources . . . exercisable together with Cana -
da’s power to manage the fishery.”72 These pleadings, which frame the
right to a fishery in terms of “livelihood needs,” reveal how central that
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approach has become to the interpretation of treaty fishing rights. The
Kwakiutl did not append “moderate” to their claim, but the term “liveli-
hood needs” suggests that they recognize some limit on their treaty right
beyond conservation. And rather than claiming jurisdiction over the fish-
eries, the Kwakiutl sought a declaration of joint management. The plead-
ings are an indication of what some First Nations believe to be possible
within the parameters of Canadian law.
Although the fisheries certainly supported Aboriginal peoples’ liveli-
hoods, there is no evidence that the Douglas treaty right was limited to
fisheries that supported “moderate” livelihoods. Where this limitation
has been imposed, as in Passenger Fishing Vessel and Marshall, it is a
later construct designed to establish some grounds for those without
treaty rights to participate in the fishery. Although the aim is legitimate,
the “moderate livelihood” standard is flawed. Beyond the fact that there
may be no historical evidence for such a standard, it is inherently vague
and changeable, and not something that courts are equipped to deter-
mine. Moreover, the building of a moderate livelihood, if its meaning
can be determined, depends on so much more than access to a resource
that it seems peculiar to establish the level of access on the basis of that
standard. A clear division of the fisheries along the lines of the Boldt
decision, which provides certainty and is broadly if not unanimously per-
ceived as a fair interpretation of the treaty, is eminently preferable to all
those working in the fisheries, and to the sustainability of the fisheries
themselves.
conclusion
In attempting to account for the Boldt decision, legal scholar Fay Cohen
has suggested that by the early 1970s the state of the law on Indian treaty
rights to fish was such that “a definitive ruling could hardly have been
avoided.”73 Perhaps so. Perhaps thirty years later Aboriginal and treaty
rights to fish in British Columbia are at a similar point, and perhaps a
case such as Hunt v. Canada will provide a definitive ruling. However,
unlike Washington State, where most of the tribes hold rights to fish
under treaties with virtually identical fisheries provisions, in British
Columbia in 2007 there is a patchwork of arrangements that include
historical treaties, one modern treaty, two final agreements in the process
of ratification, and several agreements-in-principle, all with different fish-
146 douglas c. harris
eries provisions. For most of the province there are no treaty rights but,
instead, ill-defined Aboriginal rights to fish or rights to fisheries as an
incidence of claimed but not-yet-recognized Aboriginal title. In this con-
text a single definitive ruling seems unlikely. A clear ruling from the
courts on the meaning of the fisheries provision in the Douglas treaties
will not resolve the continuing conflict over fish, but it might hasten a
resolution.
The recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights to fish in Canada has
been building slowly since they were entrenched in the Canadian con-
stitution. Steps to enhance Aboriginal peoples’ access to the fisheries,
 following decisions such as Sparrow and Marshall, have produced deter-
mined opposition from many in the commercial fleet, including court
cases based on the proposition that privileging Aboriginal fishers vio-
lates the equality guarantee in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms.74 In this there are important similarities to the reaction against the
Boldt decision in Washington. However, judicial recognition of sub-
stantial treaty rights to fish in British Columbia, should it occur, could
hardly shock the fishers and fisheries managers in the province to the
same degree that it did those in Washington.
Although a small number of Aboriginal peoples are parties to the
Douglas treaties, a fuller judicial interpretation of the right to “fisheries
as formerly” will be important across the province. It will establish the
extent to which the tribes reserved their fisheries to themselves when
they granted to the Hudson’s Bay Company the right to occupy certain
areas of their traditional territories. Understood as reserved rights instead
of granted rights (rights that the treaty tribes reserved to themselves
rather than received from the Crown), the treaty rights would represent,
at a minimum, the fishing rights that nontreaty nations still retain. As a
result, the impact of a judicial interpretation of the fisheries clause in the
Douglas treaties has the potential to extend across most of the province,
building on the basic platform of fishing rights that the Supreme Court
of Canada established in the Sparrow decision.
Given the continuing conflict over the fisheries in British Columbia
and the great difficulty in reaching negotiated settlements, a court-
directed interpretation of the fisheries provision in the Douglas treaties
seems inevitable. That interpretation, when it occurs, will be based on
the text of the treaty and the surrounding circumstances at the time each
treaty was negotiated. It is hard to imagine that the interpretation of the
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Stevens treaties in Washington State will not also have some impact on
the outcome. In a dissenting opinion in the British Columbia Court of
Appeal on a commercial fishing rights case, Justice Lambert suggested
that the interpretations of the Stevens treaties certainly ought to be con-
sidered. He thought it “of great importance to try to achieve harmony
between the recognition of aboriginal rights in British Columbia and the
recognition of aboriginal rights in Washington State, where the Indians
are closely related to the Indians of British Columbia and where they
share many of the same customs, traditions, and practices.”75
The holding in the Boldt decision that access to the commercial fish-
ery should be divided evenly between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
fishers may not be reproduced. That conclusion is perhaps too closely a
product of the particular language in the Stevens treaties. However, the
general conclusions that the treaties include rights to a substantial com-
mercial fishery and to manage that fishery seem applicable and appro-
priate to the interpretation of the Douglas treaties. If a ruling fails to
recognize that the treaties protected significant Aboriginal control of the
fisheries, it will appear manifestly unjust.
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